It is widely recognised that the adverse impacts that transnational forces are having on health determinants and outcomes require more effective collective action. The Asian region has been among the most acutely affected by the health impacts of globalisation, while many health issues in the region have potentially far reaching consequences. The rapidly rising economic status of many Asian countries, coupled with their vulnerability to global health, points to the need to better understand their contributions to GHG. This article analyses Asian contributions to three key instruments underpinning GHG -the International Health Regulations (IHR), Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIPF), and Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). It finds that, if Asian countries are to move, from ruletakers to rule-makers, there is a need to address weak capacity in the region, to go beyond traditional notions of sovereignty, and to build trust and policy processes across the region.
INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognised that the impacts that transnational forces have on health determinants and outcomes, defined here as global health, , require more effective collective action.
National health systems acting in isolation and focused on domestic concerns are seen as inadequate. This has given rise to the creation of new institutional arrangements characterised by a multiplication of state and non-state actors, and innovative institutional arrangements for bringing them together (such as public-private partnerships and new financing schemes).
Global health governance (GHG), in this context, is understood as the set of principles, norms, rules and institutional mechanisms that enables collective action on health issues of global concern (Lee, 2003) .
To date, efforts to strengthen GHG have been largely understood as led by the highincome countries of Europe and North America, with limited analysis of other regions. This neglect includes most Asian countries which, although acutely affected by the health impacts of globalisation, have been given little attention in terms of their engagement with GHG. In recent years, the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the continuing threat from H5N1 avian influenza, and the alarming rise in non-communicable diseases have contributed to a growing regional awareness of the global challenges to human health among Asian countries. National government responses so far have included the establishment of new centres for disease control, new investments in public health infrastructure, and the creation of schools of public health. However, how Asian countries are contributing to GHG, and the implications for future development of collective action on global health issues, remains poorly understood.This article analyses the contributions of selected Asian countries to the negotiation of three instruments underpinning GHG -the International Health Regulations (IHR), Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIPF), and Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Despite increased policy attention to global health issues, and a tripling of official development assistance for health since the 1990s (Chan, 2011) , there remains relatively few formal agreements governing collective action on global health. These instruments le are especially relevant to the health challenges facing Asian countries. After describing the role Asian state and non-state actors have played in the negotiation of these instruments, the article draws conclusions regarding potential regional trends in engaging with GHG. It is concluded that, if Asian countries are to move, from rule-takers to rule-makers, weak capacity, an adherence to traditional notions of sovereignty, and a building of trust and policy processes across the region must be addressed.
METHODS
Over sixty semi-structured interviews were conducted in South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, China (including Taiwan), Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to understand how Asian countries contributed to the negotiation of the three GHG instruments. Key informants comprised officials of governments (notably ministries of health and bilateral aid agencies) and intergovernmental organisations (including WHO), representatives of nongovernmental organisations (including charitable foundations), public health experts and scholars.
Interviewees were initially identified via open-source material from World Health Organization
(WHO) records, with further names generated through a snowballing technique. All interviews were conducted using a guide organised by key topic for discussion and corresponding openended questions. Interviews were conducted in English or through a locally engaged translator.
Where permission was granted, interviews were digitally recorded and then professionally transcribed. For the remaining interviews, detailed notes were recorded.
In addition to interview data, primary and secondary document sources on the participation of Asian countries in GHG negotiations were reviewed to provide background context as well as detailed understanding of the negotiation positions of individual state and non-state actors. For the FCTC, this included on-line keyword searches (by country) of official records available from the WHO Tobacco Free Initiative. To understand the tobacco industry's position on the FCTC negotiations in relation to Asia, a search of internal tobacco industry documents available on-line from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library was also conducted, using keywords "FCTC" combined with Asian country name using Boolean search terms. Regulations were reduced in scope in 1969 to four diseases -smallpox, cholera, plague and yellow fever. The confirmed eradication of smallpox in 1981 further reduced the diseases subject to the IHR to three. By the mid 1990s, this narrow scope was seen as increasingly problematic in light of several emerging and re-emerging diseases such as HIV/AIDS, West Nile virus and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (WHO, 1997: 15-16 ). Added to this, governments had become increasingly reluctant to report naturally occurring disease events in the wake of several incidents where declaring an outbreak had resulted in adverse economic impacts (e.g.
NEGOTIATING GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE
Latin American cholera outbreak in 1991, Indian plague outbreak in 1994), while revelations about the Iraq and former Soviet Union's biological and chemical weapons programs added further concern that the IHR, and indeed WHO's entire governance framework for disease outbreaks, needed reform (Minze et al., 1998: 73 One potential explanation for this may have been that, for many of the countries -notably China (including Taiwan), Japan, South Korea, and Thailand -the negotiation teams were only formed shortly before the regional consultation and were often not closely briefed by their governments:
We were given a very, very broad mandate from the government when we entered the negotiations, so we had a large amount of flexibility. The only guidance or direction we were given was that our first priority was the health of our nation's population, second was the health of the region, and third, the rest of the world. That was the extent of the mandate we were given (Interview, 23 February 2010) .
Further, the composition of the teams, which usually comprised three to five persons, varied in level of expertise and experience in public health, international law, and/or foreign affairs. As one interviewee recalled, (Interview, 25 February 2010) .
Another factor affecting the capacity of teams to participate meaningfully in both the regional consultations and the IGWG meetings was language. As one respondent noted, The institutional framework for global influenza governance was born alongside the creation of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1946. Recalling the 1918 pandemic, which killed over 40 million people worldwide, the goal was threefold: (a) to plan for future influenza pandemics; (b) to develop control methods to limit the impact of a pandemic; and (c) to limit the economic consequences of influenza. In 1947 the World Influenza Centre (WIC) was created in London to collect and distribute information, conduct and coordinate laboratory work, and train laboratory technicians. The Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), which underpins the entire system, was then established in 1952. The network operates via WHO Collaborating Centres (CCs), which receive influenza virus samples from National Influenza Centres (NICs), and undertake analysis to identify virus strains circulating at a given time. This data is passed to pharmaceutical companies to develop seasonal or pandemic influenza vaccines accordingly. In 1952, an Expert Committee on Influenza was formed to provide technical advice and general oversight (Payne, 1953: 763) . Today, augmenting GISN's work is the internet-based FluNet, linking NICs and WHO CCs in a virtual network, to ensure rapid global exchange of surveillance data (WHO, 2009a) . Despite the above efforts, there has generally been dissatisfaction with regional organisations. As one government official noted, 'There is no genuine collaboration between ASEAN. It is just rhetoric. There is no sense of partnership' (Interview, 3 November 2009).
Another informant agreed,

Yes, ASEAN is extremely weak but it is not a criticism per se. You have to remember that ASEAN was effectively established to be an anti-communism forum, but that is obviously not as big a threat as it once was. As such, there are no strong incentives for these countries to really work together anymore (Interview, 16 November 2009).
One cited reason for the underperformance of regional bodies was a lack of trust among Asian governments. One official, for example, held the view that 'Singapore is outstandingly bad in terms of collaboration. They don't have the ASEAN perspective. It is the only rich country within ASEAN, and yet when we have an initiative that we need funded they simply say "no".
They take and they never give' (Interview, 3 November 2009). Likewise, the Japanese government's donation to create the antiviral stockpile was seen as 'funded by Japan for the security of Japan' (Interview, 3 November 2009). More broadly, a lack of trust also appears to have contributed to undermining regional efforts to establish a new framework for whole-ofgovernment pandemic preparedness. As one key informant stated,
A specific example I could share with you relates to the issue of multi-sectoral preparedness -a group of countries were supposed to be doing an assessment in every country which they had agreed they would and then pilot it in Indonesia. Firstly though, it took a lot of time to get buy-in on what should be the indicators and how
was the assessment going to be done. Then, when they did do the pilot, momentum was lost as individual countries said, 'Well, we don't really need that team of consultants from other member states to come into our country. We can do a selfassessment' (Interview, 6 November 2009) . In this context, the GISN system remained largely unchallenged until 2007 when Indonesia announced it would withhold virus samples in protest at inequities in accessing influenza vaccines and anti-viral drugs. It was argued that, while low-and middle-income countries shared virus samples that supported global influenza control, the resultant medicines manufactured by private pharmaceutical companies were either too expensive or prepurchased by high-income countries. As a result, negotiations commenced to achieve a "fair and equitable distribution of pandemic influenza vaccines at affordable prices in the event of a pandemic" (WHO, 2007b) . Negotiations, however, proved prolonged, extending over four years. Unsurprisingly, Indonesia was a prominent participant throughout the negotiations, which were chaired respectively by Jane Halton of Australia and Viroj Tangcharoensathien of Thailand. In 2007, a proposal by low-income countries, led by Indonesia, unsuccessfully called for WHO to supply H5N1 virus samples to vaccine makers only with the consent of the donor country. Instead, the adopted resolution stated that during "public health emergencies of international concern," including influenza pandemics, manufacturers should have "full access" to viruses from all affected countries. Over the next four years, disagreement remained over the precise meanings of "timely sharing" of samples and "fair" distribution of vaccines and other benefits (Kamradt Scott and Lee 2011). After talks stalled again in 2010, the working group sought the input of non-state actors notably representing the interests of low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) and the pharmaceutical industry. The latter's recognition, of the need to support countries such as China and Indonesia to build their own pandemic vaccine capacity, and to ensure tiered-pricing, paved the way for eventual agreement.
After four years of negotiations, the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIPF) was agreed in April 2011 (WHO, 2011) .
The PIPF sets out the terms, conditions and prohibitions governing the sharing of H5N1 influenza viruses, intellectual property pertaining to influenza vaccines and related technology, and the resulting benefits that arise from these activities. Under the terms of the new agreement, manufacturers are expected to make an annual monetary contribution to 50% of the GISN's running costs, allow for at least 10% of vaccines or anti-viral drugs to be purchased by low-income countries at affordable prices, and encouraged to grant non-exclusive licenses at affordable royalties or royalty free to low-income countries for the production of vaccines and other products. Although the level of benefits remains lower than hoped for by LMICs, the Framework is seen as an important step forward in global influenza governance. The Asian region had much to gain from stronger tobacco control. Of the world's 1.3 billion smokers, 700 million live in Asia (Brandon, 2010) . The region contains three of the five largest tobacco-using countries (i.e. China, India and Indonesia) in the world, and was expected to suffer the vast majority of projected tobacco-related deaths by 2030 (Mathers and Loncar, 2006) . Of the 5.5 million people who die from smoking-related illnesses each year, half are in Asia. China and Indonesia alone account for 1.7 million smoking deaths (Brandon, 2010) .
Moreover, such issues as cigarette smuggling, the impact on tobacco consumption of trade agreements, and crossborder marketing and advertising required effective collective action across countries. At the same time, however, tobacco control was a low priority in most Asian countries which had large and thriving tobacco industries, both domestically owned (such as Japan Tobacco International, Korean Tobacco and Gingseng and the China National Tobacco Corporation), and increasing penetration by transnational tobacco companies (TTCs).
This conflict between public health and economic interests defined the contributions of specific Asian state and non-state actors to the negotiation of the FCTC. While the FCTC process increased overall support for tobacco control in the region, and gave rise to an active regional policy network of public health advocates, some governments such as China and Japan acted as "spoilers" by seeking to weaken the measures eventually adopted. For example, Japan's position during negotiations on the adoption of such measures as "light"
and "mild" labeling, health warnings; and bans on vending machines remained influenced, according to reports, by a "fear that implementing such policies in the country where 340 billion cigarettes were sold last year would be devastating to tax revenues and tobacco farmers" Given the desire by WHO to enable as many countries as possible to accede to the treaty, negotiators sought to agree "the lowest acceptable common denominator in clause development" (Assunta and Chapman, 2006) .
Similarly, China is the largest producer and consumer of tobacco in the world. the FCTC is needed since tobacco is a global problem…. It's impossible for any single country to cope with the tobacco problem because it is a transnational problem. Thailand would welcome protocols on the effective eradication of tobacco smuggling, a global ban on tobacco advertising and sponsorship, the elimination of duty-free sales of tobacco products, the harmonization of taxes on tobacco products at international level, the exemption of tobacco products from reduced taxation under regional free-trade agreements, the mandatory testing and reporting of toxic constituents, and the establishment of a mechanism for information-sharing. The clear shift in the global burden of tobacco-related disease and death to the developing world, and Asia in particular, is now fully underway. Prior to the FCTC process, few
Asian countries had adopted effective tobacco control policies to mitigate this looming public health crisis. This follows considerable diversity in the contributions of Asian countries to the negotiation and implementation of the FCTC, closely aligned with the political economy of the tobacco industry. The subsequent growth of the tobacco control movement in Asia, led by state and non-state actors, suggest much potential for the FCTC as a GHG instrument. The effectiveness of the FCTC ultimately depends on how it catalyses actions at the national and regional levels which overcome its flexibilities and qualifying language. In this respect, much work remains to be done. Better data on tobacco production and consumption worldwide, weak capacity to adopt and enforce stronger regulation, and limited resources remain major challenges. Most importantly, it must be recognised that the FCTC, as a GHG instrument, supports rather than undermines Asian countries in a global political economy.
CONCEPTIONS OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: BALANCING SOVEREIGNTY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
The three case studies suggest a tension between traditional notions of state sovereignty across Asian countries, and the need for collective action to address global health issues. This was evident in both the IHR and virus sharing negotiations, which were framed in the language of "global health security" (WHO, 2008b) . In the context of the IHR, many Asian governments generally saw the agreement as a technical framework for addressing disease outbreaks. Thus, even though several high-income countries had expressed concerns over the potential for terrorist-instigated public health events, many Asian delegations expressed their objections towards the inclusion of terrorism and/or terrorist-related activities within the scope of the IHR:
One of the main issues for us throughout the formal negotiations was the definition of 'disease' in the IHR. North America and Europe really wanted to include terrorism and terrorist events but our government objected to this notion. There was no need to include this (Interview, 25 February 2010).
Significantly, Asian countries were not alone in their objections and, with the support from two regional blocs of Eastern Mediterranean and African states, a compromise was struck on a definition of "disease" that avoided explicit mention of terrorist-related activities (KamradtScott, in press). Overcoming restrictions based on perceived national interests, to enable WHO to investigate suspected outbreaks of collective global interest, lay at the heart of an effective global disease control system. Ultimately, the former view prevailed and, under Article 10 of the revised IHR, WHO is required to obtain the consent of governments before sending investigative teams.
The issue of state sovereignty also played an important role when the status of Taiwan was raised. In 2003 the Taiwanese government was unable to obtain technical assistance from the WHO to control the SARS outbreak because of its non-recognition in the UN. This arguably hampered efforts to control the disease both within Taiwan and globally, and became headline news around the world. Despite being formally excluded from negotiations, Taiwan remained keen to integrate itself with regional and global disease control systems, and formed a "special task force" to review the draft IHR. A special representative was also sent to Geneva to attend the IGWG meetings, but was physically prevented from entering the building (Interview, 1
March 2010). China continued to maintain that any move to recognize Taiwan as independent from China would equate to an infringement of its sovereignty. Aware of these broader political sensitivities, the Taiwanese government 'didn't solicit support from Asian countries,'
but did indicate its compliance with the IHR despite not being recognized as a WHO member state (Interview, 2 March 2010). The tension between state sovereignty and the need for effective collective action on this issue has remained largely unresolved.
Asian governments approached the IHR negotiations in an individualistic and statecentric manner, declining to form regional alliances. While the Andean Pact (Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile and Ecuador) and the Mercosur Group (Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay), for example, met to develop coordinated positions on the draft text, no equivalent meetings were held among Asian countries (WHO, 2010 To restrict the input of non-state actors, the majority of Asian governments also voted to exclude all organizations in official relations with the WHO at the commencement of IGWG meetings in November 2004 on the basis that they were "intergovernmental" meetings. Once the revised IHR was adopted, some Asian countries appeared more willing to explore alternative, innovative arrangements for implementing the IHR. Another interviewee noted, in relation to APEC: 'Those sorts of issues won't go anywhere in that sort of forum as no-one wants to be seen to be interfering in the domestic affairs of another member country just in case another issue comes up that might involve their country being criticised' (Interview, 22 November 2009). Consequently, even though both APEC and ASEAN had launched various regional cooperation initiatives to enhance regional pandemic influenza preparedness, Asian governments avoided addressing the issue of virus sharing publicly (or even adopting a regional position), principally as it was deemed too controversial and could be seen as either criticising a neighbour, or infringing on Indonesia's sovereign rights.
While "quiet diplomacy" occurred to some extent behind-the-scenes to develop the PIPF A Japan Tobacco International (JTI) representative, speaking at the pre-negotiation public hearings, similarly argued that a "one size fits all" global solution to smoking was flawed, and that "national governments were best placed to know what their country needed' (Fujii and Price, 2000) . In the end, the adoption of qualifying language throughout the final text of the FCTC reflected the uneasy balance between strong measures to protect public health and vested economic interests.
Sovereignty-based arguments against the FCTC, genuine or otherwise, seem to have been countered by the degree to which non-state actors contributed to the negotiation process. With the notable exception of tobacco industry-related interests, TFI actively supported the mobilisation and participation of CSOs. This began with a grant from the UN Foundation to foster tobacco control advocacy in developing countries. Then TFI fast-tracked applications by selected NGOs for officially recognised status to enable them to attend negotiations. As a result, non-state actors played a key role at all stages of the FCTC process, going beyond the usually circumscribed engagement by NGOs with WHO (Collin et al, 2002) .
In Asia, Thailand was among the strongest supporters of a Canadian proposal to allow "national NGOs `with relevant expertise'…to apply for accreditation and attend, but without the right to vote in plenary meetings and in the main committee meetings" (British American Tobacco, 2000) . There is some evidence from the FCTC process that non-state actors have helped some Asian countries move beyond traditional notions of sovereignty. Recognising that the globalisation of the tobacco industry can pose a threat to sovereignty, Thailand and India were leaders in the treaty's negotiation. More broadly, the FCTC process challenged territorially-defined notions of interests, highlighting how the protection and promotion of public health involves supporting and opposing interests that span national jurisdictions. GHG, in this context, challenged Asian countries to redefine the concept of sovereignty in tackling global health challenges.
CONCLUSION: TRENDS IN ASIAN ENGAGEMENT IN GHG
There is little doubt that Asian countries have a high stake in ensuring the establishment, and effective functioning, of GHG instruments to deal with shared health challenges affecting the region. However, as Gostin (2005) writes, GHG arrangements to date are a reflection of 'entrenched power structures' given 'disproportionate influence on the global health agenda'
by powerful countries principally in Europe and North America. The case studies examined in this article suggest several trends concerning Asian engagement in GHG.
First, there appears to be a growing willingness by state and non-state actors in Asia to challenge existing arrangements, although to date this has been more through unilateral action rather than active engagement in negotiations to revise existing GHG arrangements.. China's failure to report the SARS outbreak in a timely manner (Ford et al., 2007 ), Indonesia's decision to withhold the sharing of influenza virus samples, the challenging of intellectual property rights protections by India and Thailand, alongside the limited participation by most countries in the revision of the IHR, are examples of this apparent trend.
Second, the emergence of a more assertive and proactive Asian presence or "voice" in GHG appears to be circumscribed by a limited capacity to engage meaningfully in GHG negotiations. In two of the case studies, specialist technical and legal expertise was needed to contribute to the revision of the IHR and pandemic preparednesss in relation to intellectual property rights. Sufficient language skills to negotiate on such technical matters was also variable across Asian countries.
Third, there remains enduring tensions between traditional notions of state sovereignty and recognition of the need for more effective collective action. Many Asian countries still look to their own first, even if it means incurring regional or global costs. 1 Cultural and socioeconomic diversity across Asia is an important reason for this, punctuated by a conflictridden and divisive regional history. Trust of neighbouring countries, in many cases, and regional organisations such as ASEAN and the ADB, remains delicate at best.
1 One example is the Vietnamese government's national campaign to vaccinate all poultry despite warnings that the policy was not sustainable in the long-term given high costs and labour-intensiveness. 1 Ceasing the programme, after commencement, raises the risk that new, resistant strains of the H5N1 virus may emerge to threaten the region.
Yet, at the same time, the region is at the forefront of grappling with globalisation which is driving the region's rapid economic growth and development. While the economic benefits of this headlong rush to develop are palpable, so too are the profound social and environmental costs accompanying Asia's transformation. Within the field of global health, there are opportunities for population health in Asia to improve through greater economic prosperity, improved housing and food security, and better health care. There are also clear health risks from more rapid and far reaching spread of certain communicable diseases, rise in non-communicable diseases from changing lifestyles, environmental degradation, and greater social inequities. Moreover, the health impacts of Asian globalisation are not confined to the region but have the potential to affect the rest of the world.
These findings point to the need for more active engagement by Asia in GHG. The revision of the IHR showed that strengthening capacity in the region, to enable Asian countries to participate meaningfully on the technical and legal content of negotiations, and also to engage in diplomatic processes, is critical. The negotiation of the PIPF demonstrates how emerging Asian powers may increasingly chafe at rules, such as the intellectual property rights affecting access to vaccines, made by other countries. Most interestingly, perhaps, the FCTC negotiations demonstrated the unprecedented emergence of regional positions in Asia on GHG, prompted by the dual roles of both state and non-state actors. Regional mechanisms for facilitating processes allowing policy consultation, formulation, and implementation in future negotiations may enable the region to shapeprospective GHG instruments.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• The impacts of globalisation on health within the region, and the potential for health issues in the region to have global consequences, suggest that strengthening GHG requires increased Asian engagement commensurate with the region's growing economic strength.
• Emergent forms of GHG have been shaped to date by a small number of high-income countries. Asian state and non-state actors have been increasingly inclined to challenge existing institutional arrangements and rules.
• Without stronger technical capacity and political processes to enable meaningful participation in global health governance negotiations, Asian countries will remain ruletakers rather than rule-makers. 
